EVEMISSLAB

TheoryTHY-2026-0203v0.1

Agent context as an egress surface

The context an agent needs — project roots, runtimes, browser profiles, internal endpoints, credential-loading conventions — is written into instruction files, configuration, fixtures and generated documents, and crosses a boundary it was never written for once they are published. Nine context classes (C1 workstation path … C9 generated diagnostics) keep sensitivity and risk as separate axes. Phase II observed it among individuals, organizations and companies.

Research status
EXPERIMENTAL being tested experimentally
Evidence level
E2 Controlled experiment
Data basis
BLIND PUBLIC DATA Real public files measured by an algorithm inside a sealed process. No person and no AI model read them; only coded features left the process. The numbers may be distorted.
Version
0.1
Updated
2026-10-13
Created
2026-09-21
Domain
Privacy
Program
PRG-2026-0201 AI Agent Publication Boundary and Security Closure (APBSC)
Authors
Neo.K (EveMissLab)
AI collaborators
AI collaboration recorded for the series; the collaborator is not named in the drafts, Splice (Claude Code, Anthropic) — Phase II protocols, runners, audits, reports and the integrated edition

Definitions

definitions
  • C1 workstation/local path · C2 runtime/tool topology · C3 auth/session context · C4 private network/internal endpoint · C5 live security state · C6 organization/project relations · C7 personal/identity context · C8 secret-like material · C9 generated diagnostic context

Evidence

SourceRelationTargetStatusID
OBS-2026-0201 O1 — AI collaboration files can themselves become publication surfacessupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0518
OBS-2026-0203 O3 — Public AI collaboration files can contain concrete workstation, runtime, session and internal-network contextsupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0520
OBS-2026-0205 O5 — In a frozen 60-repository company panel, both high-warning results were on agent instruction filessupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0522
OBS-2026-0206 O6 — Individuals publish files their own AI tools treat as local, such as .claude/settings.local.jsonsupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0523
OBS-2026-0207 O7 — Published agent configuration files can carry concrete home-directory pathssupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0524
OBS-2026-0208 O8 — Agent-related publication-boundary signals appear among individuals, organizations and companies alikesupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0525
EXP-2026-0201 Phase I company and bridge measurements (2026-09-20 to 2026-09-22)testsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0573
EXP-2026-0202 Rounds F1–F4 — fresh surface-balanced samples (236 repositories, 2026-10-13)testsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0580
EXP-2026-0203 Rounds P1–P2 — individuals with AI-collaboration markers (400 repositories, 2026-10-13)testsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0600
RST-2026-0203 Individuals: 2.75% publish .claude/settings.local.json, 10.5% an agent configuration filesupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0614

Recorded fields

tags
  • paper 02

Relations

SourceRelationTargetStatusID
THY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfacecontainsCLM-2026-0206 HT — Organizations in transition into AI are a higher-risk band than AI-native onesACTIVEREL-2026-0517
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundarydevelopsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0506
OBS-2026-0201 O1 — AI collaboration files can themselves become publication surfacessupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0518
OBS-2026-0203 O3 — Public AI collaboration files can contain concrete workstation, runtime, session and internal-network contextsupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0520
OBS-2026-0205 O5 — In a frozen 60-repository company panel, both high-warning results were on agent instruction filessupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0522
OBS-2026-0206 O6 — Individuals publish files their own AI tools treat as local, such as .claude/settings.local.jsonsupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0523
OBS-2026-0207 O7 — Published agent configuration files can carry concrete home-directory pathssupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0524
OBS-2026-0208 O8 — Agent-related publication-boundary signals appear among individuals, organizations and companies alikesupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0525
PAP-2026-0203 Paper 02 — Agent context as an egress surfaceformalizesTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0531
EXP-2026-0201 Phase I company and bridge measurements (2026-09-20 to 2026-09-22)testsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0573
EXP-2026-0202 Rounds F1–F4 — fresh surface-balanced samples (236 repositories, 2026-10-13)testsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0580
EXP-2026-0203 Rounds P1–P2 — individuals with AI-collaboration markers (400 repositories, 2026-10-13)testsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0600
RST-2026-0203 Individuals: 2.75% publish .claude/settings.local.json, 10.5% an agent configuration filesupportsTHY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surfaceACTIVEREL-2026-0614

History and provenance

Canonical URL
https://evemisslab.com/ai/theory/THY-2026-0203/
Machine-readable
/ai/theory/THY-2026-0203/index.json
Snapshot
AI-SNAPSHOT-v0.1-58e716495670
Provenance
source
EveMissLab research collection: AI Agent Publication Boundary and Security Closure (真本體論14)
extracted_by
Splice (Claude Code), reading the open-source release's own manifests, locks and pooled outputs, and the hashes of the internal drafts
extracted_at
2026-10-13
generator
tools/extract_all.py
claim_boundary
status, evidence level and result type follow the source artifact's own stated claim boundary; nothing is upgraded beyond what the report supports