ResearchRES-2026-0201v0.1
Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary
Papers 00–05. The five-state information chain (observed → authorized → persisted → published → externally obtainable), the green-light fallacy (V₁ ∧ … ∧ Vₙ = PASS ⇏ G), agent context as an egress surface with nine context classes, recoverability R0–R4 beyond literal secret matching, and two hypotheses about scale: organizational propagation of shared agent context, and an AI build–attack asymmetry.
Relations
| Source | Relation | Target | Status | ID |
|---|---|---|---|---|
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | belongs_to | PRG-2026-0201 AI Agent Publication Boundary and Security Closure (APBSC) | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0501 |
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | develops | THY-2026-0201 Publication-boundary closure — the integrated framework | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0504 |
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | develops | THY-2026-0202 The green-light fallacy | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0505 |
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | develops | THY-2026-0203 Agent context as an egress surface | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0506 |
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | develops | THY-2026-0204 From secret scanning to semantic privacy | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0507 |
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | develops | THY-2026-0205 Organizational propagation of agent context (hypothesis) | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0508 |
RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | develops | THY-2026-0206 AI build–attack asymmetry (hypothesis) | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0509 |
PAP-2026-0201 Paper 00 — Agentic publication boundary and security closure: the integrated framework | reports | RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0526 |
PAP-2026-0202 Paper 01 — The green-light fallacy: when agent verification succeeds and the real postcondition does not | reports | RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0528 |
PAP-2026-0203 Paper 02 — Agent context as an egress surface | reports | RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0530 |
PAP-2026-0204 Paper 03 — From secret scanning to semantic privacy | reports | RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0532 |
PAP-2026-0205 Paper 04 — Organizational agent context propagation | reports | RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0534 |
PAP-2026-0206 Paper 05 — AI build–attack asymmetry | reports | RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0536 |
PAP-2026-0211 AI Agents and the Public Boundary — the APBSC integrated public edition v1.0 | reports | RES-2026-0201 Why passing checks does not close the publication boundary | ACTIVE | REL-2026-0544 |
History and provenance
- Canonical URL
- https://evemisslab.com/ai/research/RES-2026-0201/
- Machine-readable
/ai/research/RES-2026-0201/index.json- Snapshot
AI-SNAPSHOT-v0.1-58e716495670- Provenance
source- EveMissLab research collection: AI Agent Publication Boundary and Security Closure (真本體論14)
extracted_by- Splice (Claude Code), reading the open-source release's own manifests, locks and pooled outputs, and the hashes of the internal drafts
extracted_at- 2026-10-13
generator- tools/extract_all.py
claim_boundary- status, evidence level and result type follow the source artifact's own stated claim boundary; nothing is upgraded beyond what the report supports